The pervading sense of lethargy affecting most people returning to work this week contrasts sharply with the frenetic, behind-the-scenes activity evident at most football clubs and in players’ agents’ offices.
The January transfer window, a period of questionable value, especially to employers, is prefaced by reams of newsprint devoted to how much clubs have to spend and forecasts of who will be moving where and at what cost.
Accordingly, we’re told – without any reference to UEFA’s ‘Financial Fair Play’ (FFP) rules – that while some clubs are penniless, Chelsea and Manchester City, for example, have unlimited funds and could buy anyone they want.
While this is technically accurate, because UEFA have decreed that a club’s losses cannot exceed €45 million from the current financial year onwards, a figure which falls to €30 million by 2014-15, we may expect to witness a wave of that wonderfully-effective standby, creative accounting, beloved by football clubs everywhere, when this year’s accounts are eventually published.
Players acquired during the January window rarely have a significant, longer-term impact upon their new team’s performance.
Granted, there are some notable exceptions, but because the buying process is often a knee-jerk reaction to a perceived weakness that didn’t exist at the beginning of the season, or underperformance not anticipated in August, the transfer process is driven by anxiety.
It’s usually worry, not longer-term planning, which causes clubs to spend millions on what amount to expensive stop-gap measures.
Yet FFP is having a belated impact, resulting in more Premier League clubs revisiting the Moneyball theories made popular in the USA a few years ago.
Moneyball, written by Michael Lewis, a former banker, and later made into a film starring Brad Pitt, tells the story of Billy Beane, a general manager of the Oakland A’s baseball team, who revolutionised the sport by building a winning side based upon the analysis of statistical data of players either ignored or undervalued by everyone else.
Essentially, Beane sought players either at the start of their career, when potential had been recognised and their physical abilities were evident, or when they had reached the later stages, a point at which their experience could be acquired cheaply.
Players in their prime, ie, those aged between 24 and 29, fall outside the Moneyball criteria and are ignored, left for big-spenders.
When initially aired, Moneyball theory was sidelined because football is a considerably more fluid game than baseball.
However, to a degree, the book’s practices had already been implemented in areas of French football, particularly at Lyon, cited in another sport/finance book, Soccernomics, as an example of how one comparatively poor club contradicted established thinking and built a winning machine.
Between 1998-2001, Lyon finished each season in the top three of Ligue 1 before winning seven straight league titles (2001-08), since when they’ve only once finished outside the top three.
The reasons for Lyon’s sustained success are not due to their successful acquisition of overvalued footballers during the January (or summer) transfer window, nor the installation of high-profile managers, but are considerably more prosaic.
The French club’s success is underpinned by longer-term stability, not at managerial level, but in the boardroom.
Lyon, or Olympique Lyonnais, to give them their full name, believe in the use of “crowds”, ie, the more minds they can apply to analysing a particular situation, the better the final result should be.
Such thinking contradicts management methods in England where the manager is responsible for all decision-making. Lyon have had a number of managers since 1998 (Alain Perrin, Gerard Houllier, Paul Le Guen etc), but were successful throughout because their technical director, Bernard Lacombe, and president, Jean-Michel Aulas, remained the same.
According to Soccernomics, Lyon’s secrets of success may be summarised thus:
? 1. New managers waste money: don’t let them.
An incoming manager invariably clears out the club’s ‘deadwood’, selling what are perceived to be undesirable players for a fraction of what they originally cost.
This doesn’t happen at Lyon because their style of football remains unaltered. Incoming managers or players adapt to this, not the other way round.
? 2. World Cup and European Championship stars are invariably overvalued.
The list of expensive players that have seeped into English football following a reasonably successful international championship and gone on to prove useless continues to grow remorselessly. Such players are ignored at Lyon.
? 3. Certain nationalities are overvalued.
C lubs given the option of buying buy two similarly-skilled players, one a Brazilian the other American, invariably sign the Brazilian. Yet football is embraced beyond Brazil, Argentina and western Europe. To be successful, a club must scour the world, not just a small corner of it.
? 4. Older players are overvalued, as are younger players.
As players reach 30, their value falls, although just because a player is young doesn’t mean he’ll be a success. Lyon tend to buy players in their early 20s, mature enough to adapt to a new environment, but still nearing the peak of their playing prowess.
? 5. Centre-forwards are overvalued. Goalkeepers are undervalued
The longevity of goalkeepers is legion. Consider Dino Zoff, who won the World Cup at the age of 40, or current Italian ‘keeper, Gianluigi Buffon. Brad Friedel and a host of other 30-plus goalkeepers remain at the top of their game.
By contrast, strikers are overpriced. Success at one club doesn’t necessarily mean a player will continue to score goals when moving elsewhere. For every Robin van Persie, there’s a dozen or more expensive flops.
? 6. Sell any player if another club offers more than he’s worth.
Lyon apply this rule ruthlessly, getting extremely good prices for established players, such as Essien and Malouda. It’s a cold, hard fact, but every player has a price, though it helps to have a ready-made replacement.
? 7. Buy undervalued players who have personal problems.
Perhaps the most effective English exponents of this rule were Brian Clough and Peter Taylor. The pair would ask a player what his vice(s) were and would then apply their management skills (or outside help) to rectifying it/them. Such man-management allowed Nottingham Forest and Derby to buy good players for a pittance.
Applying these seven rules requires one other thing: a visionary owner prepared to stay involved for the longer term.
Unfortunately, the January transfer window will remain a period of frenetic activity benefiting only agents and their clients as the Premier League is a little short on visionary owners.
