Quite how it happened that the Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority banded together to become "The Tripartite Authorities" for the purpose of establishing the extent to which Britain's financial powerhouse in the City of London could withstand a terrorist attack, natural disaster or "major operational disruption" was never clear.
Most likely, none of them could live with the prospect of the others doing the job. No one explained why all three together would do a better job than any one of them on its own. For all we know they brought in people who understand these unpleasant things to do the actual work for them. It would have been a good idea.
That said, these lofty institutions, charged in their various ways with overseeing the management of Britain's economy, could never publish a report confessing that a bunch of determined and electronically adept evil-doers could bring the whole caboodle crashing down in an afternoon.
The Treasury, the Bank and the FSA do not exist to spread panic and dismay. Any report from them has to conclude that everything is pretty much as it should be, just in need of a tweak of improvement here or there.
Sure enough, the findings of their " Resilience Benchmarking Project" yesterday amounted to just that. One weakness it does highlight, though, is "the significant geographical concentration of some critical business functions and back-up sites in and around London".
In other words, financial organisations could improve their chance of surviving a disaster if they removed some of their "resilience" planning from London. To Birmingham, for a start, where they would find people capable of overcoming another lapse noted in the report - ensuring that "business continuity staff are sufficiently aware of the business functions they are supporting".