The news that Patrick O'Connell is to join the will be joining the HS2 Limited - a company that is wholly owned by the Department of Transport - as their interim programme and strategy director has provoked controversy.
O'Connell, it seems, is a man with what is known as 'baggage' and, in particular, is associated with failure in the past.
HS2 staff Ltd were informed of O'Connell's appointment last week.
However, the information provided referred only to the fact that he had been the chairman at the Oxford Institute for Megaprojects. Significant recent experience was not included.
For instance, in 2011 as one of the most senior executives at BT Health he was required to provide evidence before a Parliamentary committee concerning the company's involvement in what will possibly become a textbook case study of strategic failure in the implementation of a standardised approach to care records for every patient in this country.
This IT project was utterly disastrous and resulted in some £2.7 billion of taxpayers' money being wasted.
After leaving BT Health O'Connell was then employed as a senior manager at Serco and left at the end of last year.
Serco was employed by the government to carry out a number of government-sponsored projects that proved to be equally disastrous as to what is now referred to as the 'NHS IT fiasco'.
One of Serco's projects included a £50 million contract to electronically tag criminals who had been released from prison. What became apparent was that peculiar things were going on and that Serco was being paid for prisoners who were actually back in prison.
Amazingly Serco was being paid for some prisoners who were unlikely to offend because they were in fact dead!
As a result Serco it was told that it needed to radically improve and has undergone what it describes as "corporate renewal".
Apparently Serco has learnt its lesson and since the end of January the Cabinet Office, which has responsibility for such matters, believes that it is sufficiently improved and can be allowed to tender for public sector contacts again.
O'Connell was given responsibility for improving operational efficiency throughout Serco and was employed as president of major programmes for Europe and the UK.
A report into the NHS IT fiasco believed that BT Health was overpaid and criticised the company for being unable to deliver what had been agreed in the original contract which was signed in 2003.
It should be recognised that O'Connell was not employed by BT Health in 2003 and so had no involvement in the contact.
Nonetheless his appointment has angered those who oppose the construction of HS2.
High Speed Action Alliance has been especially critical of the use of secrecy laws to suppress the publication of a report examining the cost-benefit of the proposed £50 billion line.
Using the same veto that was used to suppress Iraq war papers, Transport secretary Patrick McLoughlin argues that publication of the Project Assessment Review of HS2 should not happen on the basis that it is not in public interest.
Many believe that this report is damning of HS2 and seriously questions its long-term viability.
Anti-HS2 organisation High Speed Action Alliance believe that within government there is a fear that the real cost of building a high speed line between Birmingham and London to reduce the journey time to 49 minutes will not yield the economic benefit that is being suggested by advocates.
The appointment of Patrick O'Connell has added more fuel to the anger over the way that the project is being managed.
An unnamed spokesperson for High Speed Action Alliance made clear their feelings:
"Along with the Government's desperate attempts to hide the truth on the parlous state of HS2 as a whole, whitewashing Mr O'Connell's career is another example of how HS2 Ltd and the Government [acts] over the failing project. Mr O'Connell's role in the NHS IT contract clearly shows that he is used to spending taxpayer money rather than investing it properly. It is hysterical."
I would fully accept that blaming O'Connell for the failure of the NHS IT project as well as the problems suffered by Serco is unfair in that people at that level cannot realistically be involved in every aspect of operations.
But someone must take responsibility for corporate failure.
However, what is beyond doubt is that people at O'Connell's level are paid salaries that commensurate with their level of responsibility.
It is argued that such salaries must be sufficient to reward them for taking the key strategic decisions intended to produce the sort of success that will enable investors to enjoy 'adequate' return on investment or, in the case of public sector organisations, value for money.
As the saying goes, 'the buck stops with them' and if things go wrong then they should expect to take the blame.
But as any reader of Private Eye which is published every two weeks knows, being willing to accept failure and the potential of being excluded from holding a senior position again if found responsible is not a prospect that the captains of British industry, politics or the chief executives of public sector organisations believe will befall them.
Indeed, quite the contrary.
In every issue of Private Eye that I have ever read, and I have been a subscriber for over a quarter of a century, there are always accounts of failed senior managers and executives making sure that failure does not blight their ability to resurface in well-paid jobs.
In effect, it seems, there is a 'club' in which these senior managers ensure that they can control the system by which they are appointed and, of course, enjoy the benefits of success or failure as, it seems, it frequently doesn't matter whether their strategy succeeds.
Crucially those considered sufficiently elite enough to be part of this coterie make strenuous effort to ensure that we, 'the great unwashed', are excluded from knowing what really goes on.
Given the recent scandals of, for example, appalling hospital care and standards, MP's expenses and, the greed and hubris of financiers and developers that resulted in the catastrophe of the global financial crisis, you would have thought we would have learnt some lessons and demand ever great scrutiny in the way that the systems operate.
What would appear to be missing is any form of punishment for wrongdoing which we all appear to be expected to pay for when things go really wrong.
Writing in yesterday's Observer Will Hutton made precisely this point with respect to the unwillingness of anyone, particularly the government, to intervene and make an example of wrongdoing.
As Hutton asserts, in banking there still exists a culture customers being treated with contempt in coupled with the desire to create systems allowing executives to enjoy the benefits of 'success'.
Hutton's anger is all-too-apparent in his contrast of what happened to executives of Anglo Irish bank and those who controlled Lloyds bank which in December was fined £28 million by the Financial Conduct Authority.
Former Anglo Irish bank executives are on trial in Dublin for involvement in what is considered to be fraud.
The public support this believing that what they and others like them did contributed to Ireland going for from being an exemplar of dynamic enterprise and creativity - the 'Celtic tiger' - to a 'basket case economy' and from which it will take generations to fully recover.
In Lloyds, Hutton suggests, there existed a culture of "champagne" bonuses to "loot their customers with policies cynically designed to offer nothing of value,", and amounted to what he considers to be "nothing less than organised theft."
However, he cites what happened to Helen Weir who was the former head of Lloyds' retail banking division.
She is now the finance director of high street retailer John Lewis.
Though Weir did say she was sorry for what went on when she was in charge of Lloyds Hutton appears to feel this is inadequate.
Having taught strategy and written a book about its key concepts, I can attest to the fact that conceiving of, let alone implementing, a successful strategy is hugely dependent on a number of factors; many of which, such as the national and global economy, are beyond the control of one person.
However, the myth continues to persist of the applicability of the theory of the 'great man' (or woman) who can magically transform an organisation.
Frequently their appointment is based on offering an outlandish strategy that will potentially give the organisation competitive advantage. After all, why would you be offered a senior management position by merely offering stability and continuing with the existing way of doing things?
And in order to secure the services of this 'great' person the remuneration packages increase.
It's a game only available to a select few; outsiders need not apply!
As I have stated on previous occasions there are many commentators, myself included, there is a serious problem in the gap between the executive salaries and the average earnings of employees in the organisations they control
This gap is disproportionate and rising fast and cannot be regarded as healthy.
What is notable by its absence is a disincentive to implementing strategies that are fundamentally risky to all stakeholders; particularly employees.
And as has been demonstrated by high street banks when things go catastrophically wrong we all end up paying.
We need to inculcate a culture in which everyone has a say in the development of strategy followed by its implementation.
This sort of democratic approach has been proven to creating success; see what happened under the leadership of charismatic Brazilian Ricardo Semler in Sau-Paulo based company Semco.
Closer to home there is Germany where the problem of executives on over-inflated salaries tends not to exist and workers have much greater involvement in strategy and decisions concerning operations.
The 'jury' is out on the benefits of HS2.
It may indeed produce significant benefit to Birmingham and its citizens.
However, the obfuscation of those behind HS2 and appointment of Patrick O'Connell will do nothing to increase confidence in any potential advantage.
And as we know from experience of all major projects - think about the 2012 London Olympics - once construction commences they are completed regardless of the final cost.
Even if the end cost is way over budget we, the taxpayers, are required to underwrite it.
We should demand more accountability from our leaders in every aspect of society both in the public and private sector.
